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From Lonrho to BHS: The Changing Character of Corporate Governance in 
Contemporary Capitalism  
Paddy Ireland 
 
INTRODUCTION: FROM FACET TO NORM 
Edward Heath was not noted for his memorable turns of phrase. Indeed, one of the 
few phrases for which he is remembered – ‘the unpleasant and unacceptable face of 
capitalism’1 – appears to have been unintended, the mistaken product of a mixture of 
vanity and myopia. In 1973, in a Commons debate on the talks taking place between 
the TUC and the CBI about inflation, Heath was asked to condemn the practices of 
Lonrho.2 Although he was short-sighted, Heath was loathe to wear glasses and he 
couldn’t quite make out the words on the script provided by Number 10: ‘This is an 
unpleasant and unacceptable facet of capitalism’.3 By omitting the ‘t’, he unwittingly 
coined a phrase which continues to be wheeled out when particularly egregious 
corporate scandals come to light.  It got one of its most recent airings in 2016 in the 
report of the House of Commons Joint Work and Pensions and Business, Innovations 
and Skills Committee into BHS. The way in which ‘Sir Philip Greene, Dominic Chappell 
and their respective directors, advisers and hangers-on’ had got ‘rich or richer’ at the 
expense of ‘ordinary employees and pensioners’, the report concluded, was ‘the 
unacceptable face of capitalism’.4 It was used again in August 2017 by the Prime 
Minister, Theresa May, to describe the practices of companies who had ‘deliberately 
broken rules designed to protect their workers’ and ‘award[ed] pay rises to bosses that 
far outstrip[ped] the company’s performance’.5 
It’s worth briefly reminding ourselves of the events that prompted Heath’s original 
condemnation. Lonrho had begun life in 1909 as a mining company, before gradually 
branching out into ranching, agriculture and asbestos. The company only really began 
to take off, however, when Roland W (‘Tiny’) Rowland joined the board in 1961. 
Ruthlessly and skilfully exploiting the opportunities thrown up by de-colonisation, 
Rowland quickly turned the company into an international conglomerate based in 
Africa. Schmoozing, bribery and corruption were central parts of his modus operandi. 
For the most part, the British government were happy to turn a blind eye as they sought  
to find new and covert forms of control to replace the direct forms of the colonial era.6 
                                                          
1 HC Deb 15 May 1973 vol 856 c1243 
2 Originally the London and Rhodesia Mining and Land Company Ltd.  
3 See J Campbell, Edward Heath: A Biography (Jonathan Cape, 1993) 528; M McManus, Edward 
Heath: A Singular Life (Elliott & Thompson, 2016) 132.  
4 House of Commons, Work & Pensions and Business, Innovation & Skills Committees, BHS: First 
Report (July 2016), p55, para 168.  
5 The Mail on Sunday (27 August 2017): http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-4826658/PM-Time-
tackle-unacceptable-face-capitalism.html.   
6 They continued to turn a blind eye even when it became apparent that Lonrho was engaged in busting 
the sanctions which were imposed on Rhodesia following UDI in 1965. See C Uche, ‘Lonrho in Africa: 
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In the early 1970s, however, with Lonrho in need of finance, a new Chairman was 
appointed (Duncan Sandys, a former Conservative cabinet minister), together with a 
number of new board members, including Sir Basil Smallpeice, ‘the personification of 
City orthodoxy’.7 Smallpeice and others quickly became concerned about financial 
irregularities, including illicit payments to Sandys, and Rowland’s style of 
management, which involved circumventing, ignoring and deceiving the board. A 
boardroom dispute broke out in which eight of the directors, led by Smallpeice (dubbed 
by City and media supporters as ‘the straight eight’), sought to remove Rowland. He 
resisted, applied for an injunction, and in the ensuing court case the company’s dirty 
linen was aired in public. It became clear that apparently respectable directors were 
avoiding taxes, being paid large sums of money for little (if any) work, and living rent-
free in expensive houses. For the Heath government it couldn’t have come at a worse 
time, for, confronted with growing labour unrest, it was  trying to clamp down on trade 
unions and strikes.8 To make matters worse, Rowland lost the case (Heath’s 
condemnation came the day after the decision), but won the war: the court decided 
the composition of the board should be left to the shareholders and a few days later 
at a rowdy extraordinary general meeting, Rowland, using his 20% shareholding in the 
company and with the support of the great majority of the other shareholders, was able 
not only to retain his position on the board but to vote off the eight opposition directors. 
The shareholders, it seems, didn’t care about his methods as long as the dividends 
kept rolling in. 
Post-BHS, it is tempting to conclude that nothing much has changed and that a certain 
amount of morally reprehensible behaviour is part and parcel – a ‘facet’ – of capitalism, 
the price we have to pay for the benefits it brings. That certainly seems to have been 
Heath’s view. Lonrho, he argued, was an exception, not the rule: ‘one should not 
suggest that the whole of British industry consists of practices of this kind’.9 In similar 
vein, Theresa May sought to stress that the practices she was condemning involved 
only ‘a small minority of executives’.10 While there might have been some justification 
for claims of this sort in 1973, however, things have since changed and changed quite 
fundamentally. It is not simply that the volume of obviously scandalous behaviour has 
increased - though it has - but that the capitalism that has emerged in recent decades 
is in its normal operations morally reprehensible and productively dysfunctional, as are 
the forms of corporate governance that are an integral part of it. In short, the 
‘unacceptable’ is part and parcel of contemporary capitalism. It is institutionally and 
culturally embedded. As a recent blogger, comparing Lonrho to the VW emissions 
scandal, observed: ‘What high standards we must have had back then, four decades 
                                                          
The Unacceptable face of Capitalism or the Ugly Face of Neo-Colonialism?’ (2015) 16 Enterprise & 
Society 354.  
7 S Cronje, M Ling & G Cronje, Lonrho: Portrait of a Multinational (Pelican 1976) 104 
8 See Cronje et al, note 7, chap 7, 134-145. Most famously through the Industrial Relations Act 1971 
(c.72). 
9 See Hansard debate, note 1. 
10 City AM, 27 August 2017: http://www.cityam.com/270909/theresa-may-launches-new-rules-
executive-pay-and-workers 
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ago, if a relatively minor dispute over governance could make such headlines’.11 The 
Lohrho scandal didn’t, after all, involve a company collapse, massive job losses or the 
destruction of thousands of employee pensions.12  
This paper explores the ways in which corporate governance and capitalism have 
changed in the forty or so years separating Lonrho and BHS and examines how what 
could be described with some plausibility as a ‘facet’ of capitalism in 1973 has become 
closer to the norm in 2017. It begins by sketching out the logic of capitalism and the 
ethics that must be expected to accompany it, before moving on to explore the different 
ways this logic has played out in empirical reality since the end of the Second World 
War, particularly in the corporate context. The paper argues that the post-war heyday 
of social democracy saw the logic of capitalism tempered and restrained, but that 
recent decades have seen the more ‘acceptable’ form of capitalism that resulted from 
this replaced by a much-less-acceptable, highly financialized, neoliberal form of 
capitalism in which the logic of capitalism operates in an increasingly pure and 
unadulterated manner.13 In this context, the paper argues that it is not, as some have 
suggested, today’s neoliberal capitalism that is abnormal and exceptional, but, rather, 
the socially democratic capitalism of the post-war period. As time has passed, it has 
become clear that the latter was the product of a very specific conjuncture. What we 
are now experiencing is corporate capitalism operating according to its normal, 
financialized, and inherently unethical logic. From this perspective, ‘regulation’ in the 
traditional sense – in which certain arrangements and processes are left untouched 
and treated as though they are unalterable givens with a pre-regulatory existence14 - 
is unlikely to deal with the problems we are facing. An ‘acceptable’ capitalism, the 
paper concludes, would be much less of a capitalism, or, indeed, something 
substantially other than capitalism. 
 
THE LOGIC OF CAPITALISM 
One only has to reflect on capitalism’s self-description – its own account of how it 
operates and the nature of the people operating within it – to see that a tendency 
towards unethical behaviour is embedded in its institutional logic. Capitalism purports 
to be a system based on competitive free markets in which consensual contractual 
exchanges take place between private agents seeking personal material gain. These 
                                                          
11 https://www.marketingsociety.com/the-library/unacceptable-face-capitalism#W657HxHfkTEacZik.97 
12 The buck did not stop at Green’s door. For example, Goldman Sachs were heavily involved in the 
sale of BHS to the consortium led by the former bankrupt, Dominic Chappell: 
https://www.ft.com/content/0ff4c558-51ae-11e6-befd-2fc0c26b3c60#axzz4FLhjs3Vd. Since this article 
was written, the multinational construction company Carillion has collapsed in a manner bearing many 
similar features to BHS. 
13 Following Gerald Epstein, I use the terms ‘financialized’ and ‘financialization’ broadly to refer to ‘the 
increasing role of financial motives, financial markets, financial actors and financial institutions in the 
operations of the domestic and international economies’: G Epstein, ‘Introduction’, in G Epstein (ed), 
Financialization and the World Economy (Edward Elgar 2005) 3.   
14 For a discussion of this, see P Ireland, ‘Property, Private Government and the Myth of Deregulation’, 
in S Worthington (ed), Commercial law and Commercial Practice (Hart 2003) 85. 
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market exchanges are secured and guaranteed by a neutral state which protects 
private property rights and freedom of contract. There is no ceiling on the size of the 
material gains that these market actors might secure as long as they play by the rules; 
nor should there be.15 The search for unlimited wealth is ‘rational, … natural and 
normal, and therefore to be expected’ because it is consonant with human nature.16 
Unlike many of its rivals, capitalism is free from moral self-deception: it accords with 
and reflects human nature, and recognises the egoism of homo economus and her 
insatiable appetite to consume.17 Market competition and this absence of limits also 
underpin capitalism’s dynamism and ability to deliver material wealth. Moreover, as 
any large accumulations of wealth arising out of market processes are the products of 
voluntary and consensual exchanges, they are prima facie legitimate. They are further 
legitimised by the fact the self-interested pursuit of unlimited material gain in 
competitive markets operates in the wider public interest by ensuring the efficient 
allocation of resources and the maximisation of aggregate social wealth: private vice 
yields public benefits.18 In recent decades, in the corporate context, these ideas have 
found expression in the idea that ‘maximising shareholder value’ benefits not only 
shareholders but society as a whole. From this perspective, the globalisation and 
liberalisation of product and financial markets and the heightened competition this has 
brought is to be welcomed, for the operation of these markets has compelled 
managers to profit maximise and to produce as efficiently as possible. If they don’t 
they simply won’t survive. Market imperatives are positive forces, underpinning 
capitalism’s efficiency, productiveness, inventiveness and relentless (endogenous) 
dynamism.19  
 
Contained within this account of human nature and the economic functioning of a 
‘pure’ capitalism is an account of how economic actors must be expected to behave. 
As E P Thompson observed, capitalism contains ‘an economic logic and a moral logic’, 
which are ‘different expressions of the same kernel of human relationship’ and which 
find ‘simultaneous expression … in all systems and areas of social life’, in norms and 
culture, and ‘in characteristic values and modes of thought as well as in characteristic 
                                                          
15 Oxfam recently reported that the world’s richest 8 individuals owned as much wealth as the poorest 
50% of the world’s population: https://www.oxfam.org/en/pressroom/pressreleases/2017-01-16/just-8-
men-own-same-wealth-half-world. Others have made similar claims, though the number varies. Even if 
the 8 were increased a hundred or a thousand fold, the point would stand. 
16 W Streeck, ‘Taking Capitalism seriously: Towards an Institutionalist Approach to Contemporary 
Political Economy’, (2011) 9 Socio-Economic Review 137 at 149 (his emphases). This section is 
indebted to Streeck’s excellent analysis. 
17 This naturalises and legitimates capital’s need for endless expansion, and for ever rising consumption 
and for the construction of new desires. It also underpins the tendency within neo-classical economics 
to view even seemingly selfless acts as motivated by self-interest. From this perspective, altruism 
generates misallocations of resources. 
18 This perhaps explains why Peter Mandelson was so ‘intensely relaxed’ about people getting ‘filthy 
rich’. ‘The normalized actor under capitalism is someone who does not relent in his [or her] effort to get 
richer regardless of what he has already achieved; for him ‘the sky is the limit’, and there is no pre-
established point where he has ‘had enough’ or is institutionally expected to have enough’: Streeck, 
note 16, 149. 
19 On the centrality of these market imperatives to the logic of capitalism, see EM Wood, The Origin of 
Capitalism (Verso 2002) chapter 1. 
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patters of accumulation and exchange’.20  For Thompson, these logics are derived 
from, and rooted in, capitalism’s institutional arrangements, and in particular its social 
property relations. By contrast, for the defenders of capitalism they are derived from, 
and rooted in, human nature. Human beings are rational egoists who must be 
expected to strive to improve their position at the expense of others. The emergence 
of market institutions and imperatives both reflect and reinforce these natural 
tendencies. It follows that although they are supposed to abide by the rules of the 
game, rule makers and regulators should expect people to deal with those rules – 
labour standards, environmental regulations, tax laws and the like - and any ethical 
norms associated with them in an instrumental manner, ‘from the perspective of how 
they may be applied, avoided or circumvented for individual benefit’. As a result, 
Streeck says, ‘rule makers cannot expect rule takers to interpret their rules in ways 
other than in studied bad faith’.21 Indeed, not only is it perfectly ‘natural’ for people to 
seek to bend or avoid rules and to circumvent social obligations if this generates 
market and/or material advantage, competition may compel them to do so. As Oliver 
Williamson explains, what we must expect, given the way capitalist competition 
operates, is institutionalised opportunism, deviousness and bad faith, what he refers 
to as ‘self-interest seeking guile’.22 Guile entails ‘calculated efforts to mislead, distort, 
disguise, obfuscate, or otherwise confuse’.23 The inclination to avoid rules and social 
obligations is not, of course, confined to capitalism. The difference, as Streeck notes, 
is that under capitalism, ‘the inventive pursuit of self-interest is in the spirit of the social 
order itself’; it is ‘both institutionally expected and empirically prevailing’.24 Indeed, 
outdoing and eliminating your rivals, is not only legitimate but admirable. Thus, 
entrepreneurially and inventively twisting (or avoiding) rules to one’s advantage is 
often seen – sometimes openly and publicly, sometimes more covertly – as something 
                                                          
20 EP Thompson, ‘The Long Revolution – II’ (1961) 10 New Left Review 34 at 38. EP Thompson, The 
Poverty of Theory (Merlin 1978) 84, 121, 254. See also Thompson, ‘Folklore, Anthropology, and Social 
History’ (1978) 3 Indian Historical Review 247 at 261-264. Thompson urged a return to a ‘full sense of 
a mode of production’, rejecting the idea that the ‘economic’ was somehow more ‘primary’ or ‘real’ than, 
say, the legal or cultural: see P Ireland, ‘History, Critical Legal Studies and the Mysterious 
Disappearance of Capitalism’ (2002) 62 Modern Law Review 120. Thompson’s idea of a ‘full sense of 
a mode of production’ can help us to grasp the different aspects and uses of the term, ‘neoliberalism’, 
which have led some to reject it as a useful category of analysis. Neoliberalism has been variously 
deployed used to describe a market fundamentalist intellectual project, a set of economic policies, and 
a range of cultural changes linked to growing commodification. From a Thompsonian perspective, they 
are all best viewed as different aspects of neoliberal capitalism as a mode of production in the ‘full 
sense’.  
21 Streeck, note 16, 143-44.  
22 O Williamson, Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications (New York, Free Press, 
1975) 255. 
23 O Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism (New York, Free Press, 1985) 47. For a 
critique, see GM Hodgson, ‘Opportunism is not the only reason why firms exist: why an explanatory 
emphasis on opportunism may mislead management strategy (2004) 13 Industrial and Corporate 
Change 401-418. 
24 Streeck, note 16, 144: ‘Capitalist institutions cannot but stylize capitalist actors as rational-utilitarian 
exploiters of gaps in rules. This is because of a dominant ethos that cannot condemn egoistically 
rational innovation in rule following, if not in rule breaking, and a culture that lacks the normative means 
by which to enforce and reward behaviour in good faith’.  
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to be admired (‘smart’25), rather than as something to be condemned. It is part of the 
system’s ethos and dynamic. The operation of capitalism thus tends towards the 
prevalence of what the conservative German economist Götz Briefs called ‘marginal 
ethics’ (grenzmoral). These are ‘the ethics of those least restrained in the competitive 
struggle by moral inhibitions, that is of those who because of their minimal ethics have 
under otherwise equal conditions the best chances of success and who on this 
account force competing groups, at the penalty of elimination from competition, 
gradually to adapt in their trading to the respectively lowest level of social ethics (i.e. 
to the ‘marginal ethics’)’.26 Sometimes, particularly when the market pressures are 
intense, these marginal ethics become so culturally entrenched that people operate 
far more unethically than competitive survival and success requires.27  
 
It may, of course, be that, ultimately, this sort of behaviour risks undermining the very 
system of which it is part: to function a capitalist economy needs some degree of 
mutual trust, reciprocity, solidarity, and goodwill. However, ‘one [cannot] rely on 
capitalist utility maximisers [to] exercise[e] self-restraint in the name of the collective 
interest’.28 On the contrary, in a competitive environment, adhering to ethical norms 
and taking account of the collective interest when those around you are ignoring them 
is likely to prove a recipe for failure. It is not merely that the benefits of bending and 
circumventing rules and avoiding social obligations are often considerable, but that the 
costs of failing to do so are even greater. Having moral scruples – or in the corporate 
context, seeking to act in a socially responsible manner and failing relentlessly to profit 
maximise - might prove not merely disadvantageous but potentially self-destructive. 
 
 
LES TRENTE GLORIEUSES: THE LONG POST-WAR BOOM 
How has the logic of capitalism played out over time? The Lonrho incident occurred at 
what, with hindsight, we can see as a pivotal moment in the history of modern 
capitalism: the end of the long post-war boom. Contrary to common belief, the 
depression of the 1930s was brought to an end not by government interventions like 
the New Deal but by the Second World War. Indeed, shortly before war broke out, 
amidst renewed recession, the Keynesian Harvard economist, Alvin Hansen, sparked 
a debate about the causes of the depression by eschewing explanations that focused 
on short-term fluctuations in the business cycle and arguing that deeper structural 
forces were at work. Capitalism, he suggested, tended towards ‘secular stagnation’ 
                                                          
25 In one of the 2016 Presidential debates, Donald Trump responded to Hillary Clinton’s claim that he 
hadn’t paid Federal income taxes for a number of years with, ‘That makes me smart’: 
http://edition.cnn.com/2016/09/26/politics/donald-trump-federal-income-taxes-smart-
debate/index.html.  
26 Quoted in Streeck, note 16, 145. Briefs was a conservative, Catholic, German social theorist and 
institutional economist. The erosion of ethical standards is one of the themes of the documentary 
filmmaker Alex Gibney’s series, Dirty Money. 
27 The Panama and Paradise papers provide examples of this. Some of these people are so rich their 
tax avoidance schemes seem inexplicable. 
28 Sreeck, note 16, 147. 
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and was characterised by ‘sick recoveries which die in their infancy and depressions 
which feed on themselves and leave a hard and seemingly immovable core of 
unemployment’.29 This idea was quickly forgotten, however, when war spending and 
the destruction of capital provided a basis for restored profitability. The three post-war 
decades saw a sustained period of growth: the ‘long boom’, the ‘Golden Age’ of Social 
Democracy, les trente glorieuses. During this period, various forces acted to temper 
the logic of capitalism. With trade union membership steadily rising (it peaked in the 
UK in the late 70s), collective bargaining spreading and unemployment low, labour 
was able to act as a powerful ‘countervailing power’ to capital.30 Finance, already 
weakened by the depression and subject in places such as the US to more risk-averse 
regulatory structures, was kept in check by the fixed exchange rates and strictly 
regulated capital flows of the Bretton Woods system. And the state continued, as it 
had during the war, to play a major role not only in co-ordinating and regulating the 
economy, but in distributing the social product. Although this alarmed liberal free-
marketeers, many now saw significant government interventions in the economy as 
not only socially desirable but necessary to save capitalism from itself by making it 
palatable to the economically and politically empowered working classes. These 
multifarious forces, together with sustained growth, facilitated the forging of a class 
compromise in which workers (and their political representatives) broadly accepted 
capitalist markets and property forms in return for steadily rising wages and living 
standards, redistributive tax policies, low levels of unemployment, and improving 
levels of social security, education, and health. This period saw falls in income and 
wealth inequality and was thought by many to be ushering in a new more welfare-
oriented, more humane and more co-ordinated ‘managerial’ or ‘managed’ capitalism 
based on ‘mixed’ or ‘social market’ economies.31 
 
THE CORPORATION AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE POST-WAR 
PERIOD 
Central to the idea that a new ‘good’ form of capitalism had emerged were perceived 
changes in the practices and cultures of the large corporations that dominated the 
economy. The managers of these corporations, it was believed, had acquired much 
greater discretionary power as a result of the weakening of both the internal 
                                                          
29 A Hansen, ‘Economic Progress and Declining Population Growth’ (1939) 29 American Economic 
Review 1 at 4. Unemployment in the US still stood at over 15% in 1940. See also A Hansen, Full 
Recovery or Stagnation (WW Norton, 1938). Hansen’s argument was that there was, for various 
reasons, a shortage of investment opportunities. His principal opponent in the debate was Joseph 
Schumpeter. 
30 The term was coined by JK Galbraith, American Capitalism: The Concept of Countervailing Power 
(Houghton Mifflin 1952). See also S Brooke, ‘Atlantic Crossing? American Views of Capitalism and 
British Socialist Thought 1932-62’ (1991) 2 Twentieth Century British History 107-36. 
31 As A Shonfield showed in his Modern Capitalism: The Changing Balance of Public and Private Power 
(Oxford UP 1965), although there were differences between the capitalism of this period, they all had 
certain features broadly in common: a rejection of laissez-faire, and a belief in the positive power of the 
state and a guided, planned capitalism. 
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(shareholder) and external (market) pressures on them to profit maximise. The internal 
pressures had been eroded by the growth in, and dispersal of, corporate shareholding. 
This, it was claimed, most famously by Berle and Means in The Modern Corporation 
and Private Property32, had generated a separation of ownership and control. In many 
of the large corporations that dominated the economy, ever more numerous and 
dispersed shareholders could no longer compel managers to profit maximise. At the 
same time, it was argued, the external pressures on managers had been diminished 
by the replacement of highly competitive markets populated by numerous relatively 
small firms by much less competitive, oligopolistic and/or monopolistic markets 
populated by a small number of very large firms. In ‘most sectors of the American 
economy’, Galambos explains, ‘oligopoly prevailed and, with it, competitive practices 
that downplayed short-term price competition and emphasized competition through 
product and process innovation and through new forms of marketing’.33 In these 
sectors, the argument ran, market prices had to a significant extent been replaced by 
‘administered prices’, market co-ordination by planning (both by the state and by 
corporations themselves), and competitive capitalism by ‘monopoly capitalism’.34 
Managers were further insulated from capital market pressures by their use of 
internally generated corporate funds as their primary source of new investment capital.  
 
The result, it was argued, was that the market- and shareholder-imposed, profit 
maximising logic of capitalism operated in a more muted and restrained manner, giving 
managers significantly more decision-making discretion.35 But how were they using it? 
There emerged two rather different accounts of what came to be called 
‘managerialism’, one ‘sectional’, the other ‘non-sectional’.36 The sectional version, 
exemplified by James Burnham’s The Managerial Revolution, described the 
emergence, in a variety of guises, of powerful new managerial classes acting largely 
out of self-interest. Although Burnham’s ideas were attractive to many on the free 
market right, who liked the way he lumped together Stalinism, Nazism and the New 
Deal as examples of the drift towards totalitarian ‘managerial societies’, most rejected 
his claims.37 By contrast, the non-sectional version of managerialism suggested that 
managers, under pressure from labour, governments and the wider public, were 
spurning profit maximisation and taking account of the interests not only of 
                                                          
32 A Berle & G Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (Macmillan 1932). The idea that 
there had been a separation of ownership and control in the growing number of large joint-stock 
corporations long predates this. It can be traced as far back as Adam Smith and Karl Marx. In the 
decades before Berle and Means it figured in the work of Thorstein Veblen and Walter Lippman in the 
US, and the RH Tawney, DH Robertson, and Keynes in the UK.  
33 L Galambos, ‘The US Economy in the Twentieth Century’ (1996) 3 Cambridge Economic History of 
the United States 927 at 942.  
34 See P Baran & P Sweezy, Monopoly Capital (Monthly Review Press, 1966).  
35 In the words of the Harvard economist Carl Kaysen, ‘managers possess great scope for decision-
making unconstrained by market forces’: ‘The Social Significance of the Modern Corporation’ (1957) 47 
American Economic Review 311 at 316. 
36 T Nichols, Ownership, Control and Ideology (Allen & Unwin, 1969) 43. 
37 J Burnham, The Managerial Revolution (John Day, 1941). Burnham’s work greatly influenced Orwell 
and his novel 1984. 
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shareholders but of employees, customers, local communities and society more 
generally.38 By the 1950s, in the US and the UK, this had become the dominant view 
of what managers were doing and should be doing. In the US this view was exemplified 
in the work of Berle himself, and in the UK in the work of the doyen of twentieth century 
company lawyers, LCB Gower.  
 
In the 1930s Berle had engaged in a famous debate with another American corporate 
lawyer, Merrick Dodd, about the duties of corporate directors. Berle supported 
shareholder primacy for pragmatic reasons. Dodd, on the other hand, argued that 
directors owed duties to society as a whole, not merely to shareholders.39 By 1954, 
shortly after the decision in A P Smith Manufacturing Co v Barlow40, Berle announced 
that the argument had ‘been settled (at least for the time being) squarely in [Dodd’s] 
favour’: corporate powers were held in trust by managers ‘for the whole community’.41 
The shift in Berle’s position was prompted by his belief, shared with many others, that 
managers, under less pressure from shareholders and markets, had become subject 
to a range of new pressures emanating from government, labour and public opinion 
that were forcing them to moderate their behaviour and abandon the single-minded 
pursuit of profit.42 Memories of the Great Depression and the benefits of war-time state 
planning, together with the threat of communism and greater government intervention 
in business affairs, added to the pressures on managers to moderate their behaviour 
and curb the excesses of capitalism.43  In William Bratton’s words, ‘managers were 
caught inside a web of countervailing powers and had no way to get out of control’.44   
The resulting changes in corporate managerial practice were reflected in, and 
reinforced by, changes in corporate culture. In their public statements a growing 
number of managers accepted that they had wider social responsibilities and indicated 
they thought this perfectly appropriate given the changing nature and role of 
corporations in society: corporations were now entities with social and political – as 
well as economic - powers and functions.45 For Berle, this was manifested in the 
emergence of a ‘corporate conscience’.46 There were, of course, opposition voices - 
                                                          
38 Paradoxically, Burnham popularised ‘managerialism’, but Berle’s non-sectional version of it, not his 
own sectional version. 
39 EM Dodd, “For whom are corporate managers trustees?” (1932) 45 Harvard Law Review 1147; A 
Berle, ‘For Whom Corporate Managers are Trustees’ (1932) 45 Harvard Law Review 1365.  
40 98 A.2d 581 (N.J. 1953). Somewhat ironically, Berle represented AP Smith in this case. 
41 A Berle, The 20th Century Capitalist Revolution (Macmillan, 1955) 137. 
42 Berle wrote of the emergence of a ‘public consensus’ to this effect: see A Berle, Power without 
Property (Harcourt, Brace, 1959) 110-116.   
43 In 1948, for example, Donald David, Dean of Harvard Business School (HBS), suggested that good 
management was crucial to a capitalist victory over communism: cited in R Khurana, From Higher Aims 
to Hired Hands (Princeton, 2007) 202-03. In similar vein, others saw business social responsibility as 
vital in the struggle to resist greater government intervention in the economy: see Khurana 441. See 
also H Wells, ‘Corporation Law is Dead’ (2013) 15 University of Pennsylvania Journal of Business Law 
305 at 326-27, 331-32. 
44 WW Bratton, ‘The Separation of Corporate Law and Social Welfare’ (2017) 74 Washington & Lee 
Law Review 767 at 770-71. See also Berle, Power without Property, note 42. 
45 See Berle, 20th Century, note 41, 25-40. 
46 Berle, Power without Property, note 42, 90-91.   
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support for traditional profit-centred business values continued to be voiced - but it is 
clear from the contemporary literature that, rhetorically at least, these sorts of views 
about the corporation and corporate governance were in the ascendancy. The pages 
of the Harvard Business Review, for example, were littered with managerial assertions 
about the wider social responsibilities of business, about the professional and service-
oriented nature of management, and about the social need to, and appropriateness 
of, tempering the profit motive and balancing different interests. These sorts of public 
statements convinced many that managers were becoming ‘quasi-public servants’, 
playing a role ‘as economic and social allocators, actively assuming public functions’ 
as ‘new industrial statesmen’. Hence the ideas that this was the ‘golden age of 
American management’, and that a socially responsible business elite (a world of 
‘innovative technocrats’) and socially responsible corporations were emerging.47 The 
changes in managerial theory and practice, however, had limited impact on US 
corporate law.48 
 
In the UK, Gower similarly argued that directors were now regularly taking account of 
non-shareholder interests in their decision-making and suggested that although this 
was not sanctioned by law it was perfectly legitimate and supported by public opinion. 
Shortly after the publication of his seminal Principles of Modern Company Law in 1954, 
Gower visited Harvard and wrote a couple of articles for the Harvard Law Review. The 
first was a review of a book by Emerson and Latcham which explored the possibility 
of restoring ‘shareholder democracy’, meaning shareholder control of large 
corporations. A few years earlier in the UK, this notion had figured prominently in the 
deliberations and recommendations of the Cohen Committee on company law 
reform.49 In the review Gower openly questioned Emerson and Latham’s belief that a 
restoration of shareholder control was a ‘Good Thing’. Was it ‘not time’, he asked, ‘to 
recognise that shareholder democracy, with its exclusive emphasis on the profit-
making element in corporate activity, has a slightly old-fashioned ring?’ It was only 
when Emerson and Latcham suggested that ‘the interests of shareholders [might] not 
be the only interests … that must be recognised by today’s publicly held corporation’ 
and that ‘the interests of labor, of the consumer, [and] of the country as a whole’ might 
also be worthy of consideration that Gower thought they had struck a ‘modern note’.50  
A few months later he wrote a second article on the attempted take-over of the Savoy 
Hotel Ltd by the property developer Harold Samuel.51 The incumbent directors 
                                                          
47 Management, according to Carl Kaysen, ‘sees itself as responsible to stockholders, employees, 
customers, the general public, and, perhaps most important, the firm itself as an institution’, note 35 at 
313. This idea underpinned the belief that managers were emerging as a neutral, disinterested, 
technocratic elite. See also Bratton, note 44 at 770-71 
48 See Wells, note 43 at 311.  
49 The desire to restore shareholder control underlay the Cohen Committee’s recommendation that 
shareholders should be able to remove directors by simple majority vote: Board of Trade, Report of the 
Committee on Company Law Amendment (Cmd. 6659, 1945), para 130.  
50 LCB Gower, Review of F Emerson & F Latcham, Shareholder Democracy (Cleveland: Western 
Reserve University 1954), in 68 Harvard Law Review (1955), 922 at 927. 
51 Conditions in England at this time were unusually favourable to those, like Samuel, who sought to 
take control of companies with undervalued shares, for the government’s post-war policy of ‘voluntary’ 
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successfully repelled the take-over by selling one of the company’s major assets and 
leasing it back with covenants restricting its use. But there were misgivings about this. 
‘Few of those who [had] subscribe[d] their money to joint-stock companies’, wrote a 
Times leader-writer, ‘supposed that the managerial revolution had gone quite so far 
as that’. Two Board of Trade investigations were held, the second of which concluded 
that although the directors genuinely believed that they were acting in the best 
interests of the company, they had used their powers for an improper purpose. Gower 
agreed that the directors’ actions were invalid: once they had conceded that they owed 
their duties only to the company’s shareholders ‘present and future’, ‘the impropriety 
of their actions seems obvious’. What he regretted was that the directors had not ‘come 
out boldly with an argument that they owed duties to the company’s employees and 
customers and to the public, as well as to the shareholders, and that their actions were 
justified as the only way in which the best interests of all these classes could be 
protected against the misguided threats of the would-be controller’. After all, he 
argued, in the twenty years since the Berle-Dodd debate, ‘public opinion’ in England 
seemed to have ‘hardened in favour of Dodd’s view’. It had become ‘almost an 
accepted dogma’, on both left and right, ‘that management owes duties to the four 
parties of industry (labour, capital, management and the community)’. Gower 
recognised, however, that this sentiment had not yet ‘crystallised into law’.52 Public 
opinion and directorial practice in both jurisdictions were thus at odds with the letter of 
the law.  
 
In the second edition of Principles, published in 1957, Gower went even further. There 
was, he argued, ‘growing recognition that if the major part of industry and commerce 
is to be left to un-nationalised corporate enterprise, substantial modifications will have 
to be made in the legal framework of companies’. Writers of ‘very different political 
leanings’, he explained, had expressed the view that ‘company law is unreal in that it 
treats the company as owning duties only to its members, whereas in fact its 
relationships with its workers, the consumers of its products, and the community as a 
whole, are of equal if not greater importance’.53 The legal position – that directors could 
have regard to ‘outside interests’ only in so far as they furthered ‘the primary object of 
making profits for the shareholders’ – was, Gower suggested, ‘increasingly 
anachronistic’. The reality was that ‘directors habitually have regard to [non-
                                                          
dividend limitation – which had, according to Gower, been ‘loyally followed by most boards of directors’ 
(itself indicative of the corporate governance and wider political climate at the time) – meant that the 
shares of many companies were being quoted at below the value of the underlying assets. There were, 
therefore, quick gains to be had, especially as capital gains were not normally taxable. See G Bull & A 
Vice, Bid for Power (Elek Books, 3rd ed., 1961). 
52 LCB Gower, ‘Corporate Control: The Battle for the Berkeley’ (1955) 68 Harvard Law Review 1176-
1193. US public opinion, he argued, did not support the view that ‘corporations exist for the sole purpose 
of making profits for their stockholders’. Gower nevertheless saw virtue in takeovers in that they stopped 
the emergence of self-perpetuating managerial oligarchies and acted as a spur to efficiency. This led 
him (and others) to dissent from the recommendations of majority of the Jenkins Committee on the 
question of shares with restricted or no voting rights: Board of Trade, Report of the Company Law 
Committee (1962) Cmd 1749, 207-10. 
53 LCB Gower, Principles of Modern Company Law (Stevens, 2nd ed., 1957) 56. 
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shareholder] interests’, so much so that it was ‘becoming common form for them to 
declare that industry owes duties to employees, consumers and the public, as well as 
to members’.54 The nationalised (public) corporation merely ‘recognise[d] openly what 
the public company is coming to recognise tacitly: that an enterprise should be run for 
and on behalf of the public as a whole and not merely for the benefit of a small section 
of it represented by the shareholders’.55 
 
That views of this sort were widely shared became clear a few years later following 
the decision in Parke v Daily News.56 The issue was whether it was legitimate for the 
directors of a company which was about to cease trading to make gratuitous payments 
to the employees who were about to lose their jobs. Reflecting the power of labour 
during this period, one of the principal reasons the directors were proposing to do this 
was to minimise the risk of trade union opposition to a proposed takeover of the 
defendant company’s newspapers.57 The directors were challenged by a shareholder 
claiming it was ultra vires and incapable of shareholder approval. Plowman J agreed. 
The duty of the directors was to ‘the company’, meaning the ‘shareholders as a general 
body’, and however ‘laudable’ the directors’ motives and ‘however enlightened from 
the point of view of industrial relations’, they were not legally permitted to make the 
payments. Commenting on the decision, Bill Wedderburn suggested that English law 
was now not only out of line with directorial practice but many other jurisdictions where 
directors were ‘allowed, or required, to consider the interests of persons other than the 
shareholders (eg., the nation’s, or the employees’ interests)’. It was, he ‘respectfully 
suggested’, ‘time for the Court of Appeal to put a twentieth-century face upon this part 
of English law’.58 Robert Pennington agreed. ‘An employee of many years standing’, 
he suggested, ‘surely has as recognisable an interest in the continuance of his 
employment as a shareholder has in the continued existence of his shares, and if both 
interests cease to exist on the liquidation of the company, there seems no reason why 
the company’s assets should be appropriated to satisfy the shareholders’ interests 
alone’. Was it really satisfactory ‘that directors should be required by law to manage 
the company’s affairs solely with a view to the financial benefit of shareholders’? There 
were other interests deserving of recognition: ‘It would, surely, be more in accordance 
with modern views about the functions of business enterprises in society to relieve 
directors from this myopia which the law forces on them’. Why not legally require the 
directors of public companies to take account of the interests of employees and the 
wider public, as well as of shareholders, as in Germany?59 This was stakeholding 
avant la lettre.  
 
                                                          
54 Gower, Principles, note 53, 475-76. This was reiterated in the 3rd edition of the book (1969) 522. 
55 Gower, Principles, note 53, 231. 
56 [1962] 8 WLR 566; [1962] 2 All ER 929. 
57 This is detailed in the case report and highlighted in the Pennington case note: RR Pennington, 
‘Terminal Compensation for Employees of Companies in Liquidation’ (1962) 25 Modern Law Review 
715. 
58 KW Wedderburn, ‘Ultra Vires and Redundancy’, (1962) 20 Cambridge Law Journal 141 at 143, 146. 
59 Pennington, note 57, at 718-19. 
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In 1979 and the eve of Margaret Thatcher and the neoliberal revolution, Gower was 
still expressing views of this sort. In the 4th edition of Principles, published in that year, 
he noted that, in a parliamentary debate on what was to become the 1967 Companies 
Act, the then President of the Board of Trade, Douglas Jay, had indicated that the 
government intended to ‘legislate for wider reforms in the structure and philosophy of 
our company law’ based on a re-examination of ‘the whole theory and purpose of the 
limited joint stock company, the comparative rights and obligations of shareholders, 
directors, creditors, employees and the community as a whole’.60 ‘Unfortunately’, 
Gower lamented, ‘nothing of the sort emerged’, with the result that ‘at present …our 
company legislation is in greater disarray than at any time since the beginning of the 
century – both in content and in form’.61 Elsewhere in the book he argued that in the 
US the belief that companies carried such responsibilities had become ‘widely held’62, 
noting the CBI had also ‘recognised the need for a public company to accept social 
responsibilities, over and above what the law require[d], in regard to such matters as 
the “environmental and social consequences of its business activities”’. Gower also 
recognised, however, that these ideas ‘posed difficulties for directors and managers 
whose over-riding legal duty is still to act bona fide in what they consider to be the best 
interests of their company, which, at present, is translated by English law as the long-
term interests of their shareholders’.63 The insertion of ‘at present’ reflected Gower’s 
hope that the law might change. Later in the book, he reiterated his view that directors 
not only should have regard to the interests of employees, consumers and the wider 
society, as well as of shareholders, but that they did this as a matter of empirical fact. 
For Gower, the lack of acknowledgement of ‘the position of the worker in the corporate 
structure’ was ‘anachronistic’ and a ‘failure of company law’. He welcomed clause 46 
of the 1978 Companies Bill, which later became s46(1) of CA1980 and s309(1) of CA 
1985, as ‘desirable’.64  
 
CAPITALISM TRANSFORMED? 
There is no doubt that during the post-war period the operating logic of capitalism was 
tempered. Although belief in profit maximisation was still alive and well in some 
quarters65, capital’s freedom of movement was constrained and labour was relatively 
strong, with the result that managers often had little choice but to bend, at least to an 
extent, to other interests. Class compromise was facilitated by consistently good levels 
of economic growth (OECD countries enjoyed real GDP growth of 4-5% per annum in 
                                                          
60 House of Commons debate 14 February 1967, vol 741, column 359.  
61 LCB Gower, Principles of Modern Company Law  (4th ed., 1979), 56.   
62 Gower, note 61, 62-63.  
63 Gower, note 61, 62-63. Gower was referring here to the CBI’s 1973 Watkinson Report, The 
Responsibilities of the British Public Company (1973), which was designed to stave off the threat of 
industrial democracy posed by the EC’s Draft 5th Directive on Company Law, OJ [1972] C131/49, which 
advocated adoption of the German two-tier board structure. See S Wheeler, ‘Gone and almost entirely 
forgotten: the Watkinson Report’, (2009) 60 Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 263.  
64 Gower, note 61, 66-67, 578-80. Section 309 read: ‘The matters to which the directors of a company 
are to have regard in the performance of their functions include the interests of the company’s 
employees in general, as well as the interests of its members’. 
65 See, for example, FX Sutton et al, The American Business Creed (Harvard UP, 1956). 
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the 1950s and 60s). The resulting changes in corporate practice generated further 
changes in business culture and education, which themselves fed back into practice. 
Crucially, the dilution of shareholder primacy by corporate managers was increasingly 
seen in many quarters not only as a fact of life but as legitimate. Was it really 
appropriate to continue to regard passive, rentier shareholders as ‘owners’ entitled to 
have corporations run in their exclusive interests and to regard these powerful 
oligopolistic enterprises as purely ‘private’ entities?66  
 
Alongside these more ‘socialised’ corporations, there emerged a softer, more 
inclusive, less rapacious, less unequal, less scandal-ridden, more humane, and 
‘acceptable’ form of capitalism. During this period, the distribution of the social product 
was determined not only by market forces but by complex tripartite negotiations 
between capital, labour and the state. The forms of negotiation and distribution varied 
from place to place, as did the outcomes, but, overall, as Piketty and others have 
documented, income and wealth inequality declined. Underpinning this softening of 
the logic of capitalism and moderation of corporate behaviour was, of course, the 
changed balance of class forces and the changed legal, financial and political 
structures that it brought. It is with some justification that Jeffrey Gordon claims that 
‘the 1950s were the high-water mark’ of both ‘managerialism in corporate governance’ 
and ‘stakeholder capitalism in the United States’.67 The same was true of the UK.  
 
It is not insignificant, perhaps, that the loosening of the competitive logic and market 
imperatives of capitalism seems to have coincided with a decline in the incidence of 
serious managerial misbehaviour. Brian Cheffins observes that although there were 
examples of managerial misconduct in the 1950s,68 ‘corporate scandals were rare, 
despite the relative absence of ‘shareholder vigilance’.69 Richard Roberts agrees, 
arguing on the basis of his examination of reporting in the Financial Times that while 
there had been ‘a string of financial scandals and debacles’ in the first thirty or so years 
of the century, the ‘decades from the mid-1930s to the mid-1960s were notably free of 
                                                          
66 On this, see P Ireland, ‘Financialization and Corporate Governance’, (2009) 60 Northern Ireland Legal 
Quarterly 1 at 8-18. In Europe the post-war decades saw many support enhanced workers’ rights and 
representation (an idea culminated in the UK in the Bullock Report of 1978), with some advocating the 
relegation of shareholders to the status of preferred creditors. A ‘close examination’ of the ‘rights 
conferred by shares and debentures’, Gower argued in 1957, revealed the ‘impossibility of preserving 
any hard and fast distinction between them which bears any relation to practical reality’: Gower, note 
53, 321-22. In the US, Robert Calkins, Dean of Columbia School of Business in the 1940s, indicated 
that he didn’t think large corporations could be neatly characterised as either ‘public’ or ‘private’. In 
similar vein, the sociologist Philip Selznick listed the institutions of industry among those he thought had 
‘become increasingly public in nature’: both quoted in R Khurana, From Higher Aims to Hired Hands: 
The Social Transformation of American Business Schools and the Unfulfilled Promise of Management 
as a Profession (Princeton UP, 2007) 201.  
67 JN Gordon, ‘The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States, 1950-2005’, (2007) 59 Stanford 
Law Review 1465 at 1511. 
68 For some examples, see B Cheffins, ‘Corporate Governance since the Managerial Capitalism era’, 
(2015) 89 Business History Review 717 at 721. 
69 B Cheffins, ‘How Corporate Governance moved to the forefront of Management’, LSE Blog 
contribution: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/73571/1/blogs.lse.ac.uk-
How%20corporate%20governance%20moved%20to%20the%20forefront%20of%20management.pdf 
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major scandals, both in the City and Wall Street’.70 In similar vein, Manfred Bienefeld 
notes that between 1948 and 1973, there wasn’t a single major banking crisis as 
defined by the World Bank, in stark contrast to what had happened before and what 
has happened since.71 This was the wider context in which Heath made his remarks.  
 
More contentious was the question of whether the changes marked a major systemic 
shift. In the US, Berle clearly believed that the changes were both radical and 
permanent. The rise of the corporate economy and dispersal of shareholdings, he 
argued, had disempowered shareholders, empowered managers and freed industry 
from the naked pursuit of profit. It had also forced the state to intervene to ensure that 
this newly acquired managerial power was used in the interests of society as a whole. 
The ‘institution of private property’ and ‘in limited measure the institution of the “market 
economy”’ had been maintained72, but there had been a ‘twentieth century capitalist 
revolution’.73 By the 1950s the idea that the US had become a ‘people’s capitalism’ 
was taking root.74 In the UK, the influence of these ideas was apparent in the 
intellectual struggles that racked the Labour Party. As early as 1940 Evan Durbin, 
anxious to reduce the influence of Marxist ideas within the Party, was drawing on Berle 
and others to suggest that a new, transformed, more ‘socialised’ variety of capitalism 
was coming into existence.75 After Durbin’s death, the baton was taken up by another 
‘revisionist’ Labour Party intellectual, Anthony Crosland.  
 
Crosland believed that in the post-war years the traditional logic of capitalism had been 
irrevocably undermined. Like Berle, he thought that shareholders had been largely 
disempowered by the rise to dominance of joint-stock corporations and transfer of 
control to ‘non-owning managers’. ‘Top management’, he argued, ‘is [now] 
independent not only of the firm’s own shareholders, but increasingly of the capitalist 
or property-owning class as a whole, including financial institutions’.76 At the same 
time the rise of strong trade unions and powerful ‘anti-capitalist’ political parties had, 
in a period of low unemployment, seen labour emerge as a formidable counter-weight 
to capitalist power, with the state brokering relations between them and playing an 
ever larger role in managing the economy. Co-operation was becoming as important 
as competition. The result was a ‘quite different configuration of economic power’ 
                                                          
70 R Roberts, ‘Financial Times – Scandals and Debacles’: 
http://gale.cengage.co.uk/images/FT%20Scandals%20and%20Debacles.pdf.   
71 M Bienefeld, ‘Suppressing the Double Movement to secure the dictatorship of finance’, in A Bugra & 
K Agartan (eds.) Reading Karl Polanyi for the Twentieth First Century (Palgrave, Macmillan, 2007) 13 
at 21-22. 
72 A Berle, The American Economic Republic (Harcourt, Brace 1963) 99. 
73 Berle, The 20th Century, note 41; Berle, Economic Republic, note 72, 169 
74 For a discussion and debunking of this, see A Preis, ‘Myth of “People’s Capitalism” (1962) 23 
International Socialist Review 3. 
75 E Durbin, The Politics of Democratic Socialism (Routledge London, 1940). He also drew drew on 
earlier Labour Party intellectuals like RH Tawney. 
76 CAR Crosland, The Future of Socialism (1956, revised edition, Schocken Books, New York, 1963), 
15. CAR Crosland, ‘The Transition from Capitalism’ in RHS Crossman, New Fabian Essays (Turnstile 
Press 1952) 33 at 35, 38-41. 
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which was impacting on business attitudes and ethics. ‘The decline of capitalist control 
[did] not mean that the profit motive ha[d] disappeared’, but maximum profit was no 
longer pursued ‘at all costs’. Echoing Gower, he argued that ‘private industry’ had 
become ‘very sensitive to public opinion’ and ‘traditional capitalist ruthlessness’ had 
‘largely disappeared’. ‘Most businessmen’ were now ‘tinged by … more social attitudes 
and motives’.77 With ‘private industry … at last becoming humanised’, capitalism was 
‘undergoing a metamorphosis into a quite different system’.78 ‘Capitalist features and 
attitudes no longer predominated’, and it was, therefore, ‘misleading’ to refer to Britain 
as a capitalist society.79 A ‘post-capitalist society’ was emerging.80  
 
Crucially, for Crosland, this meant, as it had for Keynes many years earlier81, that 
seeking to take industry into public ownership (nationalisation) was no longer 
necessary to achieve socialist goals. Nor indeed were radical and politically 
contentious changes to corporate rights structures. In Crosland’s view, ownership was 
‘unimportant’.82 As a result, when it came making changes to the legal position of 
shareholders, workers and the community, Crosland confessed to feeling ‘rather 
neutral’, as he ‘doubt[ed] whether a major change [would be] worthwhile in practice, 
or indeed whether the legal issue really much matters’.83 He favoured greater 
consultation of workers at local level (but not ‘joint management), ‘a more equitable 
distribution of non-pecuniary privileges and less social gap’ between staff and labour, 
and greater involvement of trade unions in policy-making at national level (‘high-level 
industrial democracy’). He rejected proposals for government and worker directors. 
Trying to effect ‘major changes in company law’ which would diminish or eliminate the 
residual proprietary rights of shareholders would simply not be worth the effort: large 
companies were already being ‘socialised’, changing the law ‘would make no 
difference to the underlying reality’.84 This did not prevent industrial democracy 
becoming a major issue in the 1960s and 70s, but the proposals of the Bullock 
Report85 for two-tier boards were diluted by the Labour Government in a subsequent 
White Paper86 and discarded altogether when the Conservatives returned to power in 
1979.  
 
NEOLIBERALISM: THE RISE TO DOMINANCE OF FINANCIAL CAPITAL 
                                                          
77 Crosland, Future of Socialism, note 76, 17-22. Later in the book, he wrote: ‘what is wrong with large 
public companies to-day … is not a lack of “public responsibility”’, 271.  
78 Crosland, ‘The Transition from Capitalism’, note 76, 35. 
79 Crosland, Future of Socialism, note 76, 23, 34-35. 
80 Crosland, ‘The Transition from Capitalism’, note 76, 37-38. 
81 JM Keynes, ‘The End of Laissez-Faire’ (1926). Available at: 
https://www.panarchy.org/keynes/laissezfaire.1926.html 
82 Crosland, Future of Socialism, note 76, 251. 
83 Crosland, Future of Socialism, note 76, 265 
84 Crosland, Future of Socialism, note 76, 271-76. 
85 Department of Trade, Report of the Committee of Inquiry on Industrial Democracy, Cmnd. 6706 
(HMSO, 1977). 
86 Industrial Democracy, Cmnd. 7231 (HMSO, 1978). 
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By the early 1970s, however, cracks were beginning to appear in the house-trained, 
social democratic model of capitalism constructed in the post-war years. With 
profitability falling and stagnation threatening once more, the post-war accommodation 
between capital and labour came under renewed pressure. Initially, the distributional 
conflicts that resulted were tempered by wage rises for labour paid for by price 
increases. But this merely displaced the problem, which now manifested itself in rising 
inflation. Growing industrial unrest, amplified by the relatively poor performance of 
British capitalism, provided the backdrop to the Donovan Commission (1965-68)87, In 
Place of Strife (1969)88 and the Industrial Relations Act 1971.89 As noted earlier, it also 
provided the immediate backdrop to the 1973 debate in which Heath, asked to 
condemn Lonrho, spoke of the ‘unacceptable face of capitalism’.  
 
Profitability problems and the impact on capital of the countervailing power of labour 
underlay the backlash that began to gather force in the 1970s. This backlash was 
exemplified by a memorandum written by Lewis Powell for the US Chamber of 
Commerce in 1971, shortly before be became a Supreme Court Justice. Entitled 
‘Attack on American Free Enterprise System’, it called on corporate America to 
aggressively reassert itself.90 Emblematic of the fightback that capital began to launch 
against labour at this time, the sentiments expressed in the Powell memorandum 
foreshadowed the emergence of a range of right-leaning think tanks promoting free 
market ideas and policies that prioritised privatisation, marketization, selective de-
regulation and the interests of capital over labour. In a highly complex, multi-faceted 
process of sustained institutional transformation with inter-twined economic, legal, 
political and ideological dimensions, the fetters on capital (and especially financial 
capital) were removed and the socially democratic capitalism of the post-war period 
gradually dismantled.  
 
There has been a tendency to portray these changes – and particularly the 
globalisation of markets, and especially financial markets – as largely inevitable, as 
the products of unstoppable technological and market forces (the rise of global 
telecommunications, information technology, containerisation and so on), rather than 
the products of political choices made by states.91 This belief underlies the idea that 
‘there is no alternative’ (TINA). But, as Susan Strange says, ‘it is very easily forgotten 
that [international financial] markets exist under the authority of and by permission of 
the state, and are conducted on whatever terms the state may choose to dictate, or 
allow’.92 Indeed, it is the political dimensions of ‘globalisation’ – a term which is often 
used in such a way as to conceal these dimensions - that has led David Harvey to 
                                                          
87 Report of the Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers’ Associations, Cmnd 3623 (HMSO, 
1968). 
88 In Place of Strife: A Policy for Industrial Relations, Cmnd. 3888 (HMSO, 1969) 
89 Industrial Relations Act 1971, c.72. 
90 http://law2.wlu.edu/deptimages/Powell%20Archives/PowellMemorandumTypescript.pdf 
91 See E Helleiner, States and the Re-emergence of Global Finance (Ithica: Cornell University Press, 
1994) vii, 1. 
92 S Strange, Casino Capitalism (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986) 29. 
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argue that neoliberalism is best viewed as a counter-revolutionary ‘political project’ 
aimed at reducing the power of labour and strengthening the position of capital.93 
 
There is undoubtedly much to be said for this view. Recent decades have seen a 
dramatic erosion of the post-war institutional framework and its collective social 
protections. Not only has the reach of markets been extended through privatization 
and commodification, market forces have been deliberately intensified in carefully 
selected areas.94 The changes have taken locally diversified forms but their effect has 
been broadly the same: to alter the balance of power between capital and labour in 
favour of the former. Labour has been weakened by the assault on trade union and 
employee legal rights, and by the changes associated with ‘globalisation’, particularly 
the shifting of production to low wage regions and importation of cheaper foreign 
labour into domestic markets. At the same time, the fetters on financial capital have 
been removed. In 1973, the year of the Lonrho scandal, an international agreement to 
move from fixed to floating exchange rates marked the beginning of the end for Bretton 
Woods. The gradual abandonment of controls over international capital movements 
followed. We have moved from tightly regulated, nationally-based financial systems 
centred on commercial banking to a loosely regulated, global financial system centred 
on investment banks. Genuinely international capital markets have emerged and, 
aided by computerization, there have been phenomenal increases in capital flows. 
Innovation is incessant. With states much more vulnerable to capital flight, 
governments have lost much of the policy autonomy they enjoyed in the post-war 
decades. This has undermined the ability of democracy to rein in capitalism.95 The 
social and political consequences of stagnant or declining real wages, diminishing 
social provision and protection, the disempowerment of national citizenries, and 
subordination of states to global financial markets and technocratic supranational 
institutions are now becoming manifest.   
 
During this period, the corporate legal form changed relatively little, though the 
Companies Act 1948 did effect a significant strengthening of shareholder rights by 
enabling them to remove directors by simple majority vote whereas before a 75% 
majority had been required.96 As Andrew Johnston observes, shortly after this ‘the 
hostile takeover burst onto the scene’.97 The power of shareholders has, however, 
                                                          
93 D Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism (OUP, 2005). See also: 
https://www.jacobinmag.com/2016/07/david-harvey-neoliberalism-capitalism-labor-crisis-resistance/ 
94 Thus the full force of market forces has been unleashed on labour, but not always on capital, as the 
bank bailouts that followed the 2007-08 crash showed.  
95 Also worthy of note here are the ‘four freedoms’ established by the EU and the so-called ‘New 
Constitutionalism’ - new mechanisms for investor protection that have been developed using 
instruments such as Bilateral Investment Treaties. On the latter, see D Schneiderman, 
Constitutionalizing Economic Globalization (CUP, 2008). 
96 Section 184, CA 1948. 
97 A Johnston, ‘The Shrinking Scope of CSR in UK Corporate Law’ (2017) 74 Washington & Lee Law 
Review 1001 at 1005, 1009-10, 1016-18. See also L Hannah, ‘Takeover Bids in Britain before 1950’, 
(2006) 16 Business History 65. The Savoy Hotel takeover discussed by Gower (see earlier) being an 
example. 
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been augmented still more by developments outside company law, a couple of which 
are worth mention. Firstly, the rules on take-overs were modified by the introduction in 
1968 of the City Code on Takeovers and Mergers, so as to prohibit directors from 
acting to frustrate bids in the interests of employees and other stakeholders. This 
helped to pave the way for leveraged-buy-outs and has served to intensify the financial 
market pressures to which corporate managers are subject.98 Secondly, the re-
concentration of previously dispersed holdings of shares and other forms of financial 
property in financial institutions (pension funds, mutual funds, hedge funds and the 
like) has re-empowered financial property owners, including shareholders, as a class. 
As late as the mid-1960s in the US, physical persons held 84% of publicly listed 
shares. They now hold less than 40%. In the UK, it has been estimated that by 2014 
individuals owned only 12% of quoted shares.99 Acting through their institutional 
representatives, shareholders have been able to make much more effective use of 
their residual proprietary rights to (re)assert their power in and over corporations, 
shaping and in some cases directing the behaviour of executives towards ‘maximising 
shareholder value’.  
 
This institutional power is exercised both directly in individual companies and indirectly 
over the corporate sector as a whole in globalized financial markets. Indeed, the 
operations of the latter have rendered it ubiquitous.100 The competition both between 
and within institutions - portfolio managers are routinely subjected to regular (quarterly) 
market-based performance evaluation – has intensified the market pressures on 
corporate managers to deliver ‘shareholder value’. Permanently under threat, 
managers often have little choice but to prioritise dividends and share price over 
investment in new plant and equipment, in research and development, and in 
developing the skills of the workforce. Failure to meet the expectations of financial 
institutions and security analysts renders corporations vulnerable to takeover and 
managers vulnerable to removal.101 This transfer of power from boardrooms to 
financial markets has seen a highly financialized, share-price-focused logic imposed 
on corporate managers. There has been a steady decline in the share of profits 
                                                          
98 See A Johnston, Takeover Regulation: Historical and Theoretical Perspectives on the City Code, 
(2007) 66 Cambridge Law Journal 422. As he points out, s309 CA1985 did not operate in the takeover 
context: Johnstone, ‘Shrinking Scope’, note 98, 1024-26. See also, P Davies, ‘Shareholder Value, 
Company Law, and Securities Markets’, in K Hopt & E Wymeersch (eds), Capital Markets and Company 
Law (OUP, 2003) 261. 
99 See S Celik and M Isaksson, ‘Institutional investors and ownership engagement’, OECD Journal: 
Financial Market Trends, Volume 2013/2, 93; ONS Statistical Bulletin, Ownership of UK Quoted Shares: 
2014. In the UK, foreign ownership has increased dramatically, rising from 7% to 53% between 1963 
to 2012. Around 46% of this foreign ownership is based in North America, and most of this is 
institutionally held: ONS, 11-12. 
100 They also exert considerable power over states: see Wolfgang Streeck, Buying Time (2014). 
101 As Grahame Thompson says, ‘even the largest global firms can be stalked by activist investors – 
hunted by private equity or sovereign wealth funds seeking added shareholder value extraction … Few 
companies, however large or internationalised, are immune from the threat of takeover’: G Thompson, 
The Constitutionalization of the Global Corporate Sphere (OUP, 2011)  
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retained for investment102, share buy-backs have proliferated, accounting rules have 
been stretched, financial statements manipulated, and ‘externalities’ ignored or 
concealed.  
The resulting changes in managerial behaviour have not, of course, only been a matter 
of externally imposed market imperatives. Executive remuneration has been re-
designed to better align the interests of managers and shareholders. Performance 
related pay (share options, bonuses linked to share price and the like) has encouraged 
managers to pursue shareholder value maximisation by making it personally very 
lucrative: since the 1990s executive pay and perks have sky-rocketed. These 
developments have transformed corporate culture. The image of the ideal executive 
has changed ‘from one of a steady, reliable caretaker of the corporation and its many 
constituencies to that of a swashbuckling, iconoclastic champion of shareholder value’. 
The ideals of professionalism developed in American business schools to create ‘a 
managerial class that would run America’s large corporations in a way that served the 
broader interests of society rather than the narrowly defined ones of capital and labor’, 
have been ‘swept away’.103  
These financialized forms of governance have been intensified by the rise of new types 
of financial institution focused on securing quick financial gains. Beginning in the 
1980s, there emerged a number of specialist take-over firms who sought to use 
borrowed money to gain control of corporations before ‘restructuring’ them, 
recapitalising their revenue streams and selling their securities at a profit. These 
leveraged buyouts (LBOs) rendered even large corporations vulnerable to take over. 
After dwindling during the 1990s downturn, debt-financed takeovers have enjoyed a 
resurgence with the emergence of private equity (PE) firms operating with inherently 
short-termist business models.104 Eileen Applebaum and Rosemary Batt’s 
comprehensive study of PE in the US suggests that while PE firms occasionally 
provide the investment and management expertise needed to help to turn companies 
around or grow, this is exceptional.105  More usually they use debt to engineer financial 
deteriorations in the balance sheets of companies which are then used as a pretext 
for forcing through radical cost-cutting operational changes, usually involving job 
losses, greater job precarity, cuts to pay and social benefits (like pensions), poorer 
working conditions, and so on.106 PE’s search for quick capital gains usually has an 
immediate negative impact on the workforce and communities, both of which tend to 
be seen as disposable or substitutable. The employees in companies bought by PE, 
writes Robert Peston, ‘frequently undergo massive and unsettling changes in their 
                                                          
102 See, for example, E Stockhammer, Shareholder value orientation and the investment-profit puzzle, 
(2006) 28(2) Journal of Post Keynesian Economics 193. 
103 Khurana, note 43, 3-4, 20. 
104 Typically, a fund is raised, business assets purchased, operations and finances re-engineered, the 
assets sold and the investment returns distributed. 
105 E Applebaum & R Batt, Private Equity at Work (Russell Sage, NY, 2014).  
106 The cost-cutting measures typically include selling off of parts of the company, asset-stripping, 
outsourcing, and de-unionisation. In the US PE firms also often use loopholes in pension regulations in 
ways that reduce or destroy the savings of current and future pensioners. 
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working practices for which the rewards go disproportionately to senior managers and 
owners’.107 There is also considerable evidence that PE take-overs often damage the 
long-term productive health of firms.108 We shouldn’t be surprised by this. ‘After many 
years observing the leaders of this industry’, Peston writes, ‘I found [it] shocking’ that 
so many of them ‘view businesses in a very impersonal and blinkered fashion’, seeing 
them as ‘property and chattels, and statistics about cash flows and market shares’. 
They had ‘little empathetic understanding of a business as a social institution wholly 
dependent on its people’. There was ‘an unattractive, cold calculation’ to their business 
style.109 Crucially, although the practices of these takeover firms vary between 
countries and represent only a small proportion of the institutional market, their 
aggressive and highly financialized approach is not only spreading but impacting on 
corporate practices more generally. They have made an important contribution to the 
processes whereby financialization has permeated even non-financial corporations, 
hollowing them out and encouraging mangers to see firms as bundles of assets in 
which production (often now outsourced) is secondary. In this sense, as Julie Froud 
has pointed out, ‘private equity is not a special case’. PE partners have instead acted 
as ‘pioneers who have developed and tested out forms of financial and workforce 
engineering that have increasingly been normalized by public corporations’. Two 
noteworthy examples of practices pioneered by PE which have spread across the 
corporate sector are the use of high levels of debt and tax arbitrage. In Froud’s words, 
there has been ‘a kind of convergence of behaviour of organized money’, through 
which the ‘cynical financialized behaviour’ of financial intermediaries has come to ‘play 
an increasingly important role in shaping economic activity and social life’.110 PE just 
takes financialized governance ‘to the extreme’.111  
 
The result has been the emergence of a ‘second financial hegemony’112, albeit one 
which differs radically from its predecessor in that in the first hegemony of the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries ‘on the whole finance was still subordinate to 
production … the capital accumulation process continu[ing] to be focused on industrial 
capital’, whereas now the relationship has been ‘inverted’.113 Struggling to find 
profitable outlets for investment in production, capital has sought profit from 
investment in financial, rather than real productive, assets, hence the huge increases 
in the financial asset portfolios of non-financial corporations. The highly financialized, 
                                                          
107 R Peston, Who Runs Britain (Hodder, 2008) 44. 
108 The bankruptcy rate of PE companies is far higher than that of public corporations: see interview 
with Applebaum and Batt: http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2014/12/andrew-dittmer-eileen-
appelbaum-rosemary-batt-private-equity-really-works.html. . Paradoxically, given the impact of PE on 
workers (lower wages, fewer jobs, reduced welfare and pension benefits, union de-recognition, and so 
on), pension funds linked to unions, desperately searching for higher yields to secure the financial 
viability of pension and health-care funds, have been significant investors in PE firms. 
109 Peston, note 107, 44-46. 
110 J Froud, Book Review, (2015) 13 Socio-Economic Review 813. PE practices, having begun and 
developed in the US, are becoming more common in Europe.  
111 M Hauptmeier, Book Review (2015) 13 Socio-Economic Review 816.  
112 G Dumenil & D Levy, Capital Resurgent (Harvard UP 2004). 
113 P Sweezy, ‘The Triumph of Financial Capital’ (June 1994) 46 (2) Monthly Review. 
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neoliberal capitalism that has emerged is singularly unconducive to socially 
responsible or ethical behavior. Partly as a result of the relentlessness and intensity 
the financial market pressures they face and partly because of a growing culture of 
greed, managers pursue short term financial performance with little or no regard to, or 
sense of responsibility for, the long-term future of firms, let alone for the interests of 
employees (or the employees of subordinate sub-contractors), the communities and 
societies within which the firms operate, or the environment.114 With financial capital 
liberated and labour struggling to provide an effective countervailing force, the logic of 
capitalism and its market imperatives have been not only reasserted but extended and 
intensified. This has precipitated a cultural descent into Götz Briefs’ ‘ethics of the least 
restrained’, with the result that what could in 1973 be plausibly described as a mere 
‘facet’ has become much closer to a norm.  
We should not, then, be surprised that, on occasions, as in the BHS case, governance 
descends into blatant looting and asset-stripping. BHS was an extreme case, but it 
was hardly out of character with the spirit of the age, as the recent collapse of Carillion, 
‘the very epitome of the modern financialized firm’, has shown.115  BHS was truly 
exceptional only in that it was possible to attach moral (if not legal) culpability to a 
specific individual and to mobilise public and political opinion against him, forcing a 
partial replenishment of the company’s pension fund. In the normal case, directors are 
rarely prosecuted116 and shareholders, although continuing to enjoy residual 
proprietary (and control) rights, are absolved from both legal liability for corporate 
debts and moral responsibility for corporate misdemeanours. With shares almost 
always fully-paid-up, de jure limited liability has become de facto no-liability, and with 
companies regarded in both law and common sense as reified entities radically 
separate from their members, shareholders are rarely considered in any way 
responsible for corporate malfeasance.117 Responsibility for dealing with most of the 
                                                          
114 In the US corporations abandoned earlier policies of “retain and invest” in favor of policies of 
‘downsize and distribute’: see W Lazonick & M O’Sullivan, ‘Maximising Shareholder Value: A New 
Ideology for Corporate Governance’, (2000) 29(1) Economy and Society 13. In the UK there was a 
marked upward shift in pay-outs from 13-20% in the 1980s to 20-35% in the 1990s and 2000s: J Froud 
et al, Financialization and Strategy (Routledge 2006) 87-88. The recent collapse of Carillion exemplifies 
the pitfalls of financialized governance in which ‘dividends and share buybacks come at the expense of 
either wages, employment or investment’: Adam Leaver, ‘Out of Time: The fragile temporality of 
Carillion’s accumulation model’. Available at: http://speri.dept.shef.ac.uk/2018/01/17/out-of-time-the-
fragile-temporality-of-carillions-accumulation-model/. 
115 Leaver, ibid. Carillion went into compulsory liquidation in January 2018, having taken on too many 
contracts on small margins and racked up debt. The company’s rising debt pile did not prevent the 
board from continuing to misrepresent the company’s financial state, or from continuing to pay 
themselves huge salaries (and bonuses), and rewarding shareholders with very good dividends. In 
contrast, they did very little to reduce the growing deficit in the pensions fund of its 40,000 global staff. 
Indeed, Carillion raised dividends every year for 16 years while running up a pensions deficit of over 
£500m.  
116 J Taylor, ‘Why have no bankers gone to jail?’, History & Policy (Policy Papers), 14 November 2013. 
Available at: http://www.historyandpolicy.org/policy-papers/papers/why-have-no-bankers-gone-to-jail 
117 On the Janus-faced nature of corporate shares and the way in which they combine proprietary 
(insider) rights with (outsider) creditors privileges, see P Ireland, ‘Corporate Schizophrenia: The 
Institutional Origins of Corporate Social Irresponsibility’, in N Boeger & C Villers (eds), Shaping the 
Corporate Landscape (Hart, 2017). 
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deleterious consequences of contemporary corporate governance (whether 
environmental disasters, lost jobs, lower wages, lost pensions, or growing inequality) 
tends to fall on states – states whose ability to raise taxes to deal with these 
consequences has been seriously undermined (in part by those very forms of 
governance) and who are themselves now seriously constrained by financial 
markets.118 Thus following the Great Financial Crash the costs of financialized 
governance were socialised, but not the corporations involved.  
 
NEOLIBERALISM: GOOD FOR CAPITAL BUT NOT FOR CAPITALISM? 
The sharp rises in income and wealth inequality documented by Piketty and others 
suggest that the changes in the balance of power between capital and labour, and 
between capital and states, have, at least in certain respects, served capital well. The 
share of the social product appropriated by the financial-property-owning elite (the ‘1%’ 
or less who own the vast bulk of these forms of property) has grown.119 This group has 
succeeded in largely detaching itself from the fate of the societies it has plundered. 
Capitalism, however, has fared less well, continuing to lurch from one crisis to another. 
In this respect unrestrained capitalism is faring no better than its house-trained 
predecessor. The crises have moved from place to place and taken a variety of 
different forms - chronic inflation and then stagflation in 70s, rising unemployment and 
public debt in 80s, rising private debt in the 1990s and 2000s, morphing once more 
into a crisis of stagnation and public (as well as private) debt following the collapse of 
the debt pyramid in 2007-08 – but they persist. Even now economic growth is sluggish 
and fragile notwithstanding sustained monetary easing, levels of debt remain high, 
real wages remain for the great majority stagnant, inequality continues to increase, 
and environmental problems continue to mount.120 In short, we are living through an 
ongoing multi-faceted economic, political and social crisis. Increasingly, recoveries 
revolve around investment in financial assets (and bubbles) rather than investment in 
new plant and equipment. Moreover, policymakers seem to have little idea what to do. 
Stuck between a rock and a hard place, they are torn between the contradictory 
demands of two electorates: the Staatsvolk, their citizenries, demanding social 
expenditures on health, education and welfare; and the Marktvolk, the financial 
                                                          
118 See W Streeck, Buying Time (Verso 2014). 
119 In the 1980s the share of national income accruing to financial institutions and rentier owners of 
financial property began to rise across the globe: see Epstein, note 13, 3-6; G Dumenil & D Levy, Costs 
and Benefits of Neoliberalism: A Class Analysis in Epstein, note 13 23; G Epstein & A Jayadev, The 
Rise of Rentier Incomes in OECD Countries, in Epstein, note 13 42. Beneficial ownership of these 
shares – and, indeed, in all forms of financial property - is very heavily concentrated amongst the very 
wealthy. As Gavin Jackson says, ‘only the very rich have substantial financial wealth’: notwithstanding 
claims about creating a ‘shareholder democracy’ and an ‘ownership society’, ‘Britain is not a country of 
widespread capital ownership’: ‘Who owns Britain’s companies?’, FT Data, 27 January 2016. 
120 See, for example, the OECD’s latest World Economic Outlook: 
http://www.oecd.org/eco/outlook/economic-outlook/.   
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markets, demanding ‘fiscal responsibility’.121 With this the tensions between capitalism 
and democracy have grown. Governments around the world are now faced by a 
popular backlash against a range of phenomena associated with ‘globalisation’ 
(immigration, ‘liberal cosmopolitanism’) and many established centrist political parties 
are struggling. 
 
Partly because of the repeated crises, and partly because of the growing international 
competition between capitalisms, in the 1980s and 90s debate began to emerge about 
the best ‘variety’ of capitalism and best model of corporate governance. In these 
debates the more ‘co-ordinated’ capitalisms and more stakeholder-oriented 
corporations of continental Europe and Japan were regularly compared with the more 
red-blooded, market-based capitalisms and shareholder-oriented corporations of the 
US and the UK.  Predictably, those on the right tended to try to establish the economic 
superiority of the latter, while those on the left sought to establish the economic (as 
well as social) superiority of the former - models of capitalism in which, in Polanyian 
terms, the economy and markets are ‘embedded’ in society.122  
Even using standard economic measures, however, it wasn’t easy to establish which 
‘variety’ was economically superior. In the 1980s the ‘non-standard’, more 
interventionist, stakeholder models of capitalism found in places like Germany and 
Japan seemed to be faring better, leading some business strategists to highlight the 
deficiencies of the American, stock-market based version of capitalism. The virtues of 
the German and Japanese models with their more ‘patient’ capital were extolled and 
warnings issued against moving towards ‘a more American-like system’.123 By the 
1990s, however, the more stakeholder-friendly capitalisms were experiencing slowing 
growth and fiscal crises, and by the time New Labour came into office in 1997, it was 
the neoliberal, stock-market-oriented model of capitalism that seemed to be enjoying 
greater economic success. At around this time a significant number of academics, 
often supported by right-leaning think-tanks, sought to establish at a theoretical level 
the economic superiority of the Anglo-American, shareholder-oriented model of the 
corporation, in one case going so far as to declare the ‘the end of corporate history’.124 
                                                          
121 Streeck, note 118. Unable in a world of free capital movement and fiscal competition to fund from 
taxes the social expenditures needed and demanded by their electorates, they have become more and 
more dependent on borrowing. 
122 K Polanyi, The Great Transformation, (1944, Beacon Press edition, 2001). In some of the literature 
there is a reluctance to use the word ‘capitalism’. A distinction is instead drawn between ‘co-ordinated 
market economies’ and ‘liberal market economies’: see W Streeck, ‘Bringing Capitalism Back in’, (2009) 
Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, 09/8. 
123 See M Porter: ‘Capital Choices: Changing the way America invests in Industry’, in DH Chew (ed), 
Studies in International Corporate Finance and Governance Systems (OUP, 1997) 5 at 16; M Albert, 
Capitalism vs Capitalism (Four Wall Eight Windows 1993); W Hutton, The State We’re In (Cape, 1995); 
R Dore, Stock Market Capitalism: Welfare Capitalism ((OUP, 2000). 
124 H Hansmann & R Kraakman, ‘The End of History for Corporate Law’, (2001) 89 Georgetown Law 
Journal 439. In the corporate context, this was manifested in the growing influence of nexus-of-contracts 
theories of the corporation and the efficient capital markets hypothesis and in the belief in the virtues of 
the market for corporate control.  
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During this period the Anglo-American neoliberal model of capitalism and the 
corporation was vigorously promoted by international agencies.125  
In the UK, New Labour, like many traditional left-leaning parties, sought to ride the 
neoliberal-capitalist tiger in search of growth, developing a ‘progressive neoliberalism’ 
combining an economic programme favouring free capital movement, de-regulation 
and labour suppression with a liberal-meritocratic politics of identity and recognition.126 
Significantly, New Labour’s Companies Act 2006, while paying lip service to 
stakeholding, explicitly enshrined shareholder primacy into English law for the first 
time, removing any lingering ambiguity about what was meant by the ‘interests’ or 
‘success’ of ‘the company’ by openly identifying it with the benefit of shareholders.127  
Since then things have changed once more. The Great Financial Crash made it clear 
that much of the prosperity brought by neoliberalism was illusory - based on a 
mountain of unsustainable private debt, asset bubbles, and consumption detached 
from productive activity. Policymakers, seemingly clueless about how to get capitalism 
functioning smoothly again, have ploughed on, further entrenching an unbridled, 
financialized model of capitalism and implementing, wherever possible, further cuts to 
welfare and social protections (‘austerity’). This has seen the ‘stakeholder capitalisms’ 
of continental Europe, already weakened by increasingly liberalised financial markets, 
further eroded.128 However, for all the monetary laxity – low interest rates, quantitative 
easing and the like - the economic engine continues to splutter, and the victims of 
neoliberalism and globalisation are now expressing their frustrations at the ballot box, 
undermining centrist party politics in populist acts of perceived self-defence. With 
collective institutions crumbling, anti-collectivist ideology in the ascedancy, and capital 
increasingly liberated from social constraint, capitalism has become ever more volatile 
and self-undermining, gradually eroding its own social and political conditions of 
existence.  
 
IS AN ACCEPTABLE CAPITALISM POSSIBLE? 
It is in this context that many have found a source of hope in another Polanyian 
concept, that of the ‘double movement’, the term Polanyi used to describe the 
dialectical process of marketization and the resistance to it. When markets and market 
                                                          
125 See, for example, the G20/OECD’s Principles of Corporate Governance, first published in 1999. For 
the latest version, see https://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/Corporate-Governance-Principles-ENG.pdf. More 
generally, see S Soederberg, The Politics of the New Financial Architecture (Zed Books, 2004). 
126 N Fraser, ‘From Progressive Neoliberalism to Trump – and Beyond’ (2017) 1(4) American Affairs. 
Available at: https://americanaffairsjournal.org/2017/11/progressive-neoliberalism-trump-beyond/ 
127 Section 172 CA2006. See Johnston, note 97, 1031. Johnston argues that directors previously had 
considerable discretion in determining what the interests of the company were and that this allowed for 
some degree of ‘stakeholding’: see also M Moore, ‘Shareholder Primacy, Labour and the Historic 
Ambivalence of UK Company Law’ (2016) University of Cambridge Faculty of Law Research Paper, 
No. 40/2016 (https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2835990); L Talbot, ‘Trying to Save 
the World with Company Law’, (2016) 36 Legal Studies 513 at 515; A Keay, ‘The Duty to Promote the 
Success of the Company: Is it Fit for Purpose?’ (2011) 32 The Company Lawyer 1. 
128 See W Streeck, Re-Forming Capitalism (OUP, 2009) and his subsequent work. 
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forces extend their reach and become increasingly unconstrained or ‘dis-embedded’, 
Polanyi argued, their operation becomes fundamentally destructive of human beings, 
nature, and society.129 At this point, he suggested, we can expect there to emerge a 
counter-movement aimed at trying to reimpose effective social control over them. In 
recent years many have latched on to this idea, anticipating (or hoping for) a backlash 
against neoliberalism, an attempt to de-commodify certain resources and to ‘re-
embed’ markets, and to build an updated social democracy.  
 
These ideas are underlain by the belief that it is possible to build social democracy on 
top of a capitalist economy and very often by the belief that the ‘good’, more humane 
capitalism of the post-war period was ‘normal’ capitalism. Thus in the 1980s, when 
Margaret Thatcher’s government set about dismantling the post-war settlement, many 
saw its policies as ideologically-driven aberrations which were flowing against the tide 
of history. Experience showed, they believed, that the harsh logic of capitalism could 
not only be tempered (its rough edges smoothed by state action) but harnessed to 
create an ever wealthier and more compassionate society – an ‘acceptable’ capitalism. 
In Manfred Bienefeld’s words, the ‘Golden Age’ showed that ‘the logic of capital could 
be reconciled with the human need for security and leisure and with the social need 
for stability and equity’.130 From this perspective, neoliberal policies were the product 
of ideological zealotry and wrong-headed theorising, and it was only a matter of time 
before ‘normality’ returned, history resumed its natural course and the victorious march 
of progressive, socially democratic institutions resumed. This mind-set, common 
amongst those (like myself) who had grown up intellectually in the post-war ‘golden 
age’, contributed to a tendency to take those institutions for granted rather than to see 
them as political achievements which needed constantly to be defended against 
pushback from capital.  
Increasingly, however, the financialized forms of capitalism and corporate governance 
of the early twentieth century (which culminated in the 30s slump) and of the modern 
era (which brought us the Great Financial Crash) have come to look like corporate 
capitalism operating ‘normally’. It is now the post-war institutional arrangements that 
delivered capitalism with a human face and les trente glorieuses that look aberrational, 
the exceptional products of a very particular conjuncture. From this perspective, the 
dismantling of social democracy looks less like a product of wayward thinking and 
much more, as Harvey suggests, like a response to capital’s existential need to escape 
social restraint. In the mid-1980s, Bill Wedderburn argued that ‘when an economy, like 
the British, is turned geriatric … the maximisation of profit leaves little space for social 
experiment’.131 He might have added, ‘or for social democracy’ and removed the 
limiting reference to British capitalism.  
                                                          
129 Polanyi, note 122. Polanyi focused on the ‘fictitious commodities’ of land, labour and money.  
130 Bienefeld, note 71, 13. 
131 KW Wedderburn, ‘Trust Corporation and the Worker’ (1985) 23 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 203 at 
249 
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Liberated from its post-war shackles and with labour disempowered, the pure logic of 
capitalism has in recent decades not merely been reasserted but extended and 
intensified.132 However, even the decline of working class power and liberation of 
finance has failed to lift the economy out of the doldrums, and there are currently few 
signs that it will.133 On the contrary, as we have seen, the lack of restraint has been a 
source of new crises. This suggests that Alvin Hansen may have been right when he 
argued that capitalism’s problems were structural and endemic, not merely cyclical. 
The claim that capitalism has an inbuilt tendency towards crisis is not, of course, new. 
It has long been central to Marxist analyses, which variously attribute it to the tendency 
of the rate of profit to fall (an alleged product of the rising organic composition of 
capital) and/or to inevitable problems of over-accumulation and under-consumption.134 
Since the 2007-08 crash, these theories have enjoyed something of a revival. Indeed, 
some mainstream economists have also begun to see capitalism’s problems as 
structural. In a speech to the IMF in 2013, Larry Summers revived Hansen’s ideas to 
try to account for the co-existence of low inflation, low interest rates and slow 
growth.135 Lamenting the chronic shortage of demand and profitable investment 
opportunities, and the apparent lack of an interest rate capable of producing healthy 
growth, Summers suggested that ‘secular stagnation’ was the defining economic 
problem of our time. Writing in 2017, he reiterated this.136 Certainly, the idea that 
capitalism, whether restrained or not, suffers from a structural tendency towards crisis 
would help to explain the similarities in the general direction of socio-economic travel 
                                                          
132 One question that arises is where does capitalism goes now that the various spatial (outward 
expansion) and temporal (debt) fixes seem to have been all but exhausted.   
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across national boundaries and different varieties of capitalism.137 It also helps to 
explain why policymakers everywhere are finding it so hard to get it functioning 
‘properly’ again.  
From this perspective, the search for an ‘acceptable’ capitalism of the socially 
democratic type found in the post-war period is likely to prove forlorn: the problem is 
capitalism tout court rather than a particular model of capitalism. Ted Heath may, 
therefore, have shown uncharacteristic foresight when he omitted the ‘t’ in ‘facet’. 
Facet implied that the traits revealed in the Lonrho case were just one unfortunate 
aspect of a multi-faceted gem, and potentially a relatively minor one at that. ‘Face’, on 
the other hand, suggested that those traits were a significant aspect of the whole – 
albeit, perhaps, ones hidden behind a more attractive mask.138  
 
 
THE CORPORATE CONTEXT: MAPPING A WAY FORWARD 
What, then, is to be done? What follows is an attempt to map the general direction in 
which we should seek to move, rather than a set of detailed, concrete policy proposals.  
We need, first, to recognise that a course which tries to humanise the capitalist market 
economy in anything resembling its current form is very unlikely to succeed. For 
example, greater ‘regulation’ in the traditional sense of the word, in which certain 
arrangements and processes are left untouched and treated as though they are 
unalterable givens with a pre-regulatory existence, is unlikely to work.139 The economic 
and moral logic and culture of contemporary financialized capitalism is such that 
corporations and corporate managers must be expected to endeavour to evade rules 
or just plain break them. BHS was an extreme example of a wider and increasingly 
entrenched phenomenon.140 The financial sector, the philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre 
argues, is a sphere marked by ‘bad character’, the skills required to be a good ‘money 
trader’ being inimical to the virtues: ‘Teaching ethics to traders’, he suggests, ‘is as 
pointless as reading Aristotle to your dog’.141   
In short, then, something much more radical is required. We need changes that will 
alter in significant ways the operating logic of our socio-economic system. An 
‘acceptable’ capitalism would, therefore, be significantly less of a capitalism or, indeed, 
something substantially other than capitalism. The goal must be not merely to try to 
regulate corporations and markets but to construct arrangements which generate and 
                                                          
137 W Streeck, How will Capitalism End (Verso 2016) chapter 10. Streeck has concluded that capitalism 
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138 See Campbell, note 3, 528.  
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operate according to a different logic. This would require a substantial amount of de-
privatisation142, de-commodification, experimentation with alternative organisational 
forms and arrangements, and a democratisation of economic life. This will require 
radical reform on multiple fronts. The political obstacles will, of course, be considerable 
and maybe insurmountable, but the alternative is likely to be, as Streeck argues, a 
capitalism that slowly disintegrates before our eyes despite the absence of an 
alternative to take its place.143 
What might more radical reform entail in the corporate context? It is important to 
remember that although ‘capitalism [has] an inner logic…, it is also a constructed 
system, and this means that the logic will unfold in ways that are shaped by the nature 
of those constructions.’144 We should also remember that these constructions are, in 
significant part, legal in nature. Recognition of this underlay the work of the early 
progressive legal realist, Robert Lee Hale, and has more recently animated the work 
of the so-called ‘legal institutionalists’.145 It also underlay the work of E P Thompson, 
for whom the distinctive economic and moral ‘logic of process’ of capitalism was 
derived not from human nature but from its distinctive property relations, hence the 
importance he attached to law in his work.146 Moreover, as Thompson recognised, 
despite its ‘inner logic’, capitalism can and has existed in many different forms. While 
the ‘number of variants is potentially ‘infinite’, he suggested, it ‘is infinite only within the 
categories of social species. Just as … there may be any number of permutations of 
breeds of dogs, and of mongrel cross-breeds, all dogs are doggy (they smell, bark, 
fawn over humans, etc.), so all capitalisms remain capitalist….’.147 Recent decades 
have seen multiple (often micro) institutional changes - many of them legal in nature 
and many of them impacting directly on the rights and power of labour and capital. 
Collectively, these changes have not only seen the economic and moral logic of 
capitalism reasserted, extended and intensified, they have subtly, and sometimes not 
so subtly, altered that logic. The result has been the emergence of a new, highly 
financialized (neoliberal) capitalism.  
In this context, it is worth remembering that a tendency towards a greater 
concentration and centralization of capital – and towards financialization - is inherent 
in the logic of capitalism. Competition encourages technological advances which often 
demand larger-scale production and larger firms; it also encourages firms to merge 
with other firms even in the absence of significant scale economies, either to eliminate 
rivals or to provide investment outlets for surplus capital.148 Both factors contributed to 
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the rise of the joint stock corporation and rapid expansion of the credit system in the 
later nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries. Crucially, the interest of the great 
majority of the shareholders in these corporations was (and is) purely financial. They 
are interested not in production or the firms in which they have invested, but in financial 
returns and capital values.149 As commentators like Marx and Veblen pointed out in 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, a tendency towards financialization 
was, therefore, inherent in these developments. Predictably, then, this period saw the 
rise of new forms of property and property relations, more financialized firms and a 
more financialized capitalism, albeit one in which industrial capital still remained 
broadly dominant.150  
It should not be forgotten, however, that the very same commentators also saw in 
these developments the possibility of a future characterised by more ‘socialised’ 
corporations and a more ‘socialised’ capitalism (and, in some cases, something other 
than capitalism). This was because of the nature of shareholding and property in these 
corporations. Corporate shareholders owned revenue rights (shares), not rights to 
tangible assets (these were now owned by the corporation as a separate legal person), 
and they had handed operational power over to professional managers. They looked 
and acted more like creditors than owners, and when shares became fully paid-up, 
they were rendered functionless.  As we have seen, in the middle decades of the 
twentieth century, as they became more dispersed, their ability to control managers 
was also diminished, raising further questions about the legitimacy of their residual 
proprietary rights. Were they not better seen as ‘owed’ rather than ‘owning’? And 
shouldn’t their corporate rights be adjusted accordingly? 151  
In the ‘golden’ post-war years, with managers subject to range of pressures from 
organised labour, the state, and ‘public opinion’, it was a ‘socialized’ vision of the future 
of capitalism that seemed to be in the process of realisation. However, socialization 
was not, as some advocated, translated into significant changes to corporate property 
rights structures. Indeed, the fact that change had been achieved without this (mis)led 
many to believe that socialization was possible without attenuating shareholder 
proprietary rights and re-allocating them, in whole or in part, to employees and other 
stakeholders. All that was needed to cement ‘stakeholder corporations’, it seemed, 
were a few tweaks to directors’ duties and the development of professional managers 
with the right values and culture. This mind-set was summed up by one of the section 
titles in Crosland’s The Future of Socialism: ‘The Growing Irrelevance of the 
Ownership of the Means of Production’.152  It also contributed (along with resistance 
from many within the labour movement) to the petering out, in the 1970s, of proposals 
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to introduce industrial democracy and worker board-level participation in 
management.153 
With hindsight, we can see that the failure to effect changes to corporate rights 
structures was a historic mistake. The survival, undiluted and intact, of the residual 
proprietary rights of the rentier shareholder has been one of the key legal foundations 
for the growing financialization of corporate governance and radical reassertion and 
intensification of the logic of capitalism. Some commentators have implicitly 
recognised this. Thus, Colin Mayer has called for the traditional emphasis on 
‘incentives, ownership and control’ to be supplemented with an emphasis on 
‘obligations, responsibilities and commitment’, proposing inter alia that voting rights be 
withheld from shareholders until they have demonstrated their ‘ownership’ credentials 
by holding their shares for a minimum period.154 It would be churlish not to support 
measures like this, aimed at getting shareholders to act more like ‘proper’, active, 
committed owners, and managers to act more like ‘stewards’. We need to recognise, 
however, that the great majority of corporate shareholding is passive and financially 
motivated, and that the increasing mediation of share ownership by institutions acting 
as the ‘general managers’ of ‘all lenders of money’ and operating in global capital 
markets has intensified this financial focus. Trying to get no-liability, no-responsibility, 
rentier shareholders and their representatives to act more like proper owners is rather 
like trying to get cats to bark.  
Indeed, reforms which propose to solve our corporate governance problems by further 
empowering shareholders and encouraging them to be more active and to act more 
like proper owners are likely to exacerbate those problems, not solve them.155 
Although proposals such as Mayer’s for time-dependent voting rights are, then, steps 
in the right direction, they don’t go far enough. The power of rentier investors – of 
finance - needs to be diminished and provision made for much greater ‘stakeholder’ 
involvement in corporate governance. What is needed is, as John Parkinson said, 
writing of the ‘pluralist’ approach to governance rejected by the Company Law Review, 
is ‘thorough-going reform aimed at altering companies’ decision-making structures 
and the location of ultimate control’.156 In short, we need to resurrect the potential 
radicalism of the mid-twentieth century, and to make, in Gower’s words, ‘substantial 
modifications [to] the legal framework of companies’ which recognise that enterprises 
of this sort ‘should be run for and on behalf of the public as a whole and not merely for 
the benefit of …. the shareholders’.157 We need at the same time to foster 
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experimentation with alternative organisational forms: social enterprises, workers co-
operatives, B Corps, community interest companies, mission-led businesses and the 
like.158 Put simply, ownership does matter, though we need to recognise that the range 
of institutional possibility is much greater than that between full liberal ownership by 
private individuals and full liberal ownership by the state.159 The rights in the ownership 
bundle can be divided and allocated in many different ways, and rights structures can 
very between resources and contexts.160  
Changing corporate proprietary structures will not, however, in and of itself change 
very much if enterprise managers (whoever they are and whatever their duties) remain 
subject to the intense financial market pressures which currently prevail. Financial 
power needs to be curbed and the financial system brought under much greater 
collective control. In The General Theory, Keynes wrote that speculators ‘may do no 
harm as bubbles on a sea of enterprise’ but ‘the position becomes serious when 
enterprise becomes the bubble on a sea of speculation. When the capital development 
of a country becomes a by-product of the activities of a casino, the job is likely to be 
ill-done’.161 In Keynes’ view, ‘the investment policy’ which was most ‘socially 
advantageous’ was not necessarily that which was most profitable. This led him to 
conclude that the state, which was better placed to take a longer view and to take 
account of the general social interest, should take greater responsibility for ‘directly 
organising investment’. He therefore advocated a ‘somewhat comprehensive 
socialisation of investment’ to channel resources away from speculation towards 
productive activity.162 An opportunity to move in this direction was lost in the crash of 
2007-08, when the losses of the banks were socialised but not the banks themselves. 
If, or, as seems more likely, when, we are confronted with further 
recessions/crashes163, we should not spurn similar opportunities. Keynes hoped that 
these ‘necessary measures of socialization’ would, by ‘leashing capitalism’164, save it. 
But events have not proceeded as Keynes hoped and envisaged. We have not seen 
the ‘euthanasia of the rentier’ and with it ‘the euthanasia of the cumulative oppressive 
power of the capitalist to exploit the scarcity value of capital’. Nor have we seen his 
hoped-for harnessing of ‘the intelligence and determination of the executive skill of the 
financier [and] entrepreneur . . . to the service of the community on reasonable terms’. 
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On the contrary, Heath’s facet has become the norm. It is time, perhaps, to recognise 
that an ‘acceptable’ capitalism may be a chimera.  
 
